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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
so "knowingly and intelligently" in order to effectively waive his
right to counsel.3 ' This requirement for a valid waiver is necessary
to assure that a criminal defendant appreciates the risks of pro-
ceeding pro se.2 As Justice Lawrence pointed out in his dissent,
the defendant's statement that he would proceed with the suppres-
sion hearing clearly was not made "knowingly and intelligently"33
and, therefore, did not meet the requirements for a valid waiver of
counsel.
The Jones court's reliance on the Speller decision by-passed
the opportunity to correct a dangerous precedent in New York law.
In addition, if the court had reversed Jones' convictions, a message
would have been sent out to trial courts that the Appellate Divi-
sion refuses to condone such constitutional violations, thereby de-
terring future transgressions of the right to counsel. It is urged
that by refusing to apply a per se rule of reversal, the Jones court
has paved the way for the future use of harmless-error analysis to
situations where it is clearly inapplicable.
Jacqueline L. Sonner
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
CPLR 3101(a) (4): To force disclosure of information possessed by
a nonparty witness, the litigant must show that the sought after
" People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 17, 324 N.E.2d 322, 327, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 844
(1974); see also People v. Williams, 96 App. Div. 2d 740, 740, 465 N.Y.S.2d 332, 334 (4th
Dep't 1983) (court must determine whether defendant's decision to represent himself was
"knowing and intelligent"). Several statutory provisions authorize the court to permit a de-
fendant to proceed pro se "if it is satisfied that [the defendant] made such a decision with
knowledge of the significance thereof." See CPL § 170.10(6) (information or misdemeanor
complaint), § 180.10(5) (felony complaint), § 210.15(5) (indictment) (McKinney 1982).
" See People v. Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d 12, 21, 438 N.E.2d 1133, 1138, 453 N.Y.S.2d 418,
423 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178 (1983). The Sawyer court stated that prior to al-
lowing the defendant to proceed pro se the court should "undertake a sufficiently 'searching
inquiry' of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the 'dangers and disadvantages' of
giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed on the defendant." Id.
(quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).
33 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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information is unavailable elsewhere
The primary purpose of Article 31 of the CPLR is to ensure
maximum disclosure of pretrial facts with minimum judicial super-
vision.' To this end, section 3101(a) of the CPLR requires full dis-
closure of all "material and necessary" evidence.2 Subsection (4),
1 See First Report of Temporary Commission on the Courts, Leg. Doc. [1957] No. 6[b]
at 122 [hereinafter First Rep.]; cf. O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 532, 523
N.E.2d 277, 282, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (1988) (Bellacosa, J., concurring) ("As is evident from the
language of CPLR 3101, civil discovery is meant to be generous and sweeping"). In Rios v.
Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 411, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (1st Dep't 1964), the court
observed:
The disclosure provisions of article 31 of the [CPLR] were intended to enlarge the
permissible use of pretrial procedure. The purpose of disclosure procedures is to
advance the function of a trial to ascertain truth and to accelerate the disposition
of suits .... [T]he [CPLR] "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every civil judicial proceeding ....
Id. (quoting CPLR 104).
2 CPLR 3101(a) (McKinney 1970). Section 3101(a) provides: "Generally. There shall be
full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action .... Id. The key words, " 'material and necessary', are ... to be interpreted liberally
to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist
preparation for trial .... [and t]he test is one of usefulness and reason." Allen v. Crowell-
Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d. 403, 406, 235 N.E.2d 430, 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452
(1968).
The drafters of CPLR 3101(a) rejected the advisory committee's proposal to require full
disclosure of all "relevant evidence and all information reasonably calculated to lead to rele-
vant evidence." See First Rep., supra note 1, at 117. However, the broad interpretation
accorded the present language of the CPLR makes the outcome synonymous with the com-
mittee's proposal. See Allen, 21 N.Y.2d at 406-07, 235 N.E.2d at 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 452
("CPLR 3101(subd. [a]) should be construed. . . to permit discovery of testimony 'which is
sufficiently related to the issues in litigation to make the effort to obtain it in preparation
for trial reasonable'" (quoting 3 WK&M 3101.07, at 31-33)); CPLR 3101, commentary at 5
(McKinney 1970) (" 'relevant', is the meaning assigned to 'material'. . . that which is 'rele-
vant' to the litigation is for that reason alone 'necessary' to it"); 3A WK&M 1 3101.07, at 31-
19 (1988) ("we believe that a broad interpretation of the words 'material and necessary' is
proper"); see also Shutt v. Pooley, 43 App. Div. 2d 59, 60, 349 N.Y.S.2d 839, 842 (3d Dep't
1973) (entitlement to disclosure extends to any information bearing on controversy);
Nomako v. Ashton, 20 App. Div. 2d 331, 333, 247 N.Y.S.2d 230, 232 (1st Dep't 1964) ("The
new enactment starts with the assumption of full disclosure"); Venable v. Brockett, 69 Misc.
2d 726, 727, 330 N.Y.S.2d 604, 606 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1972) (matter may be neces-
sary within meaning of CPLR 3101(a) even though prima facie case can be made without it).
The word "evidence" is also construed liberally to allow disclosure of any information
that could lead to admissible evidence. See Shutt, 43 App. Div. 2d at 60, 349 N.Y.S.2d at
840; Matter of Comstock, 21 App. Div. 2d 843, 844, 250 N.Y.S.2d 753, 755 (4th Dep't 1964);
H. WACHTELL & T. Mmvis, NEW YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 371-72 (6th ed. 1986); 3A
WK&M 1 3101.04 at 31-14. To ensure that the legislative intent is unambiguous, the Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Practice has introduced a modified measure to CPLR Article 31
which would permit disclosure of a material and necessary "matter." Comm. Rep. Session
Laws, June 1988, reprinted in [1988] N.Y. Laws 2333 (McKinney). "This measure would
amend Article 31 ... to ensure (1) liberalization of disclosure and (2) reduction of motion
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however, restricts a party's ability to obtain discovery information
from a nonparty absent a showing of "special circumstances. '3
Prior to its 1984 amendment,4 the "special circumstances" require-
ment was deemed satisfied whenever an attorney, by motion,5
demonstrated that such nonparty evidence was necessary to "pre-
pare fully for trial."'e Although the standard was quite liberal when
the evidence was unattainable elsewhere, the motion would be de-
practice by more informal procedures." Id.
I See CPLR 3101(a)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1989). CPLR 3101(a)(4) provides that there
will be full disclosure by "any other person, upon notice stating the circumstances or rea-
sons such disclosure is sought or required." Id.
Ch. 294, § 2, [1984] N.Y. Laws 482 (McKinney). CPLR 3101(a)(4) previously stated
that a nonparty was deposable "where the court on motion determine[d] that there [were]
adequate special circumstances." CPLR 3101(a)(4) (McKinney 1970)(amended 1984).
' CPLR 3101(a)(4) (McKinney 1970)(amended 1984). Courts were divided over whether
the pre-amendment language required a court order to proceed with nonparty disclosure.
Compare Kurzman v. Burger, 98 Misc. 2d 244, 245-46, 413 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1979) (court order required) with McNulty v. McNulty, 81 App. Div. 2d 581, 581,
437 N.Y.S.2d 438, 439 (2d Dep't 1981) (no need for court order) and Bush Homes Inc. v.
Franklin Nat'l Bank of Long Island, 61 Misc. 2d 495, 496, 305 N.Y.S.2d 646, 648 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1969) (same). However, the 1984 amendment to the statute relaxed the pro-
cedural aspects of nonparty disclosure. See CPLR 3101(a)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1989); supra
note 3. By replacing the word "motion" with "notice" the framers of the 1984 amendment
made it clear that a court order is not required in seeking a nonparty deposition. See
Slabakis v. Drizin, 107 App. Div. 2d 45, 48, 485 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272 (1st Dep't 1985); CPLR
3101, commentary at 18 (McKinney Supp. 1989) ("court order is not required in advance of
taking the deposition of a nonparty witness").
I See Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 41 App. Div. 2d 586, 586, 340 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302
(4th Dep't 1973). Professor Siegel favored this liberal standard in his commentaries. See
CPLR 3101, commentary at 39 (McKinney Supp. 1989). The Kenford standard has clearly
become "the most frequently applied" by New York courts. See 3A WK&M T 3101.33a, at
31-117 to -118 (1988). Every other department of the Appellate Division has adopted this
standard. See Kelly v. Shafiroff, 80 App. Div. 2d 601, 602, 436 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (2d Dep't
1981); Catskill Center for Conservation & Dev., Inc. v. Voss, 70 App. Div. 2d 753, 754, 416
N.Y.S.2d 881, 883 (3d Dep't 1979); Villano v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 46 App. Div. 2d
118, 120, 361 N.Y.S.2d 351, 353 (1st Dep't 1974).
Prior to the general acceptance of this liberal interpretation of CPLR 3101(a)(4), in
order to obtain a deposition from a nonparty witness, the movant had to show that the
witness either was hostile or had special knowledge. See SmEL § 345, at 424 (1978); H.
WACHTELL & T. MIRvis, supra note 2, at 369. Hostility was usually found where a witness
would not cooperate with an attorney seeking information. See SiEGEL § 345, at 424. In
addition, proving a relationship between the party and the witness helped to establish hos-
tility. See, e.g., Dimicelli v. Marcellette, 66 Misc. 2d 34, 35, 319 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1971) (spouse of plaintiff presumed hostile to defendant). A motion to ex-
amine a nonparty witness was also freely granted where that witness possessed exclusive or
special information. See, e.g., Sidowsky v. Chat Noir, Inc., 64 App. Div. 2d 697, 698, 407
N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (2d Dep't 1978) (sole eyewitness to car accident); Pascoe v. Long Island
R.R., 44 App. Div. 2d 829, 830, 355 N.Y.S.2d 167, 168 (2d Dep't 1974) (same); Sherwood v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 36 App. Div. 2d 533, 533, 318 N.Y.S.2d 636, 638 (2d Dep't 1971) (parents of
alleged poison victim had exclusive knowledge of her health history).
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nied if the attorney failed to demonstrate that the evidence could
not be obtained from some other source. The 1984 amendment
clarified some procedural ambiguities and impliedly adopted the
judicial interpretation of the special circumstances requirement.8
However, the special circumstances standard raises the following
perplexity which was not addressed by the New York legislature:
To what extent must information held by a nonparty be otherwise
unavailable before its disclosure shall be deemed "necessary to
prepare fully for trial?" Recently, in Dioguardi v. Saint John's
Riverside Hospital,9 the Appellate Division, Second Department,
held that the deposition of a nonparty witness, here the plaintiff's
treating physician, would not be granted absent an affirmative
showing by the defendant that the deposition might yield useful
information which was not already available from medical records
or other sources.10
In Dioguardi, the plaintiff, John Dioguardi, was treated by the
defendant, Saint John's Hospital, for a laceration on his left hand
and forearm. 1 After an infection developed, the plaintiff was
transferred to Saint Clair's Hospital and treated by Dr. Tulenko.12
Subsequently, Dioguardi commenced a medical malpractice action
against the defendant hospital.' s To ascertain any additional infor-
mation that may have been omitted from the medical records of
the plaintiff's physician, the defendant served a subpoena and no-
7 See Cirale v. 80 Pine St. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 113, 116-17, 316 N.E.2d 301, 302-03, 359
N.Y.S.2d 1, 3-4 (1974); see infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
I See Slabakis, 107 App. Div. 2d at 48, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 272. Each department of the
Appellate Division has reaffirmed its pre-amendment determination that special circum-
stances are present when nonparty disclosure is needed in order to prepare fully for trial.
See Desai v. Blue Shield of Northwestern N.Y., Inc., 128 App. Div. 2d 1021, 1022, 513
N.Y.S.2d 562, 564 (3d Dep't 1987); New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 113 App. Div.
2d 285, 288, 496 N.Y.S.2d 8, 10 (1st Dep't 1985); Mulvihill v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
112 App. Div. 2d 762, 762, 492 N.Y.S.2d 263, 263 (4th Dep't 1985); Reilly v. County of
Nassau, 112 App. Div. 2d 278, 278, 491 N.Y.S.2d 992, 992 (2d Dep't 1985). Moreover, the
pro-disclosure tenor of the 1984 amendment "justif[ies] all the more the conclusion that the
liberal construction accorded the 'special circumstances' language of the prior version of
paragraph 4 should also be carried forward." CPLR 3101, commentary at 23 (McKinney
Supp. 1989); see also New York Law Digest No. 304 (April 1985) (standard satisfied on
showing that disclosure is needed to prepare fully for trial); 3A WK&M 3101.33a, at 31-
118 (1988) (same).
144 App. Div. 2d 333, 533 N.Y.S.2d 915 (2d Dep't 1988).
10 Id. at 335, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
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tice for a deposition upon Dr. Tulenko as a nonparty witness.14
The Supreme Court, Westchester County, granted plaintiff's mo-
tion to quash the subpoena and notice, 5 and denied defendant's
cross motion to compel Dr. Tulenko's appearance for deposition. 16
The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed, holding
that since the defendant could not show that the knowledge pos-
sessed by the nonparty witness was more extensive than the infor-
mation contained in the medical records, the defendant failed to
demonstrate the existence of "adequate special circumstances."17
Under rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 an
attorney need show only that the sought after pretrial information
is relevant, to the pending action' 9 and is not requested solely to
harass the other litigant.20 Despite the suggestion by courts and
scholars that New York adopt the less restrictive federal discovery
rules,2' the Dioguardi court pointed out that the need to show
14 Id.
15 Id.
26 Id. The trial court has broad discretion in determining the existence of special, cir-
cumstances. See U.S. Pioneer Elecs. Corp. v. Nikko Elec. Corp., 47 N.Y.2d 914, 914, 393
N.E.2d 478, 479, 419 N.Y.S.2d 484, 485 (1979). Even absent an abuse of discretion below,
the Appellate Division may still substitute its own discretion for that of the trial court. See
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 11 N.Y.2d 367, 370, 183 N.E.2d 754, 755-56, 229
N.Y.S.2d 740, 742 (1962).
17 Dioguardi, 144 App. Div. 2d at 334, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
1" FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). The rule provides: "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending ac-
tion .... ." Id. The only difference between New York's disclosure rules and the federal
discovery rules is the special treatment governing nonparty witnesses under CPLR
3101(a)(4). See CPLR 3101, commentary at 27 (McKinney 1970).
1" See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). In federal court, a litigant is not required to exhaust other
means of discovery before taking a deposition. See Fraiser v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 22 F.R.D. 194, 196 (D. Neb. 1958); see also 2 J. MOORE, A. VESTAL & P. KURLAND,
MOORE'S MANUAL, FEDERAL PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 1502, 15-12 to -13 (1989) (discovery
is meant to be cumulative).
10 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). While the rule does not require a showing that the non-
party witness possesses information which is unavailable elsewhere, the party's request for
discovery will be denied as excessive if he has had ample opportunity to obtain the informa-
tion by discovery or if the request is duplicative, expensive or unduly burdensome. See id.
21 See Villano v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 46 App. Div. 2d 118, 120, 361 N.Y.S.2d
351, 353 (1st Dep't 1974); Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 41 App. Div. 2d 586, 586, 340
N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (4th Dep't 1973). While these courts originally proposed the liberal inter-
pretation of the "special circumstances" requirement, in dicta, both advocated the adoption
of the federal discovery rules. See Villano, 46 App. Div. 2d at 120, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 353;
Kenford, 41 App. Div. 2d at 586, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 302. Professor Siegel has suggested that
disclosure from a nonparty witness under CPLR 3101(a)(4) should be as freely available in
New York practice as it is in federal practice. See CPLR 3101, commentary at 27 (McKin-
ney 1970).
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"special circumstances" survived the 1984 amendment to CPLR
3101(a)(4).22 It is urged, however, that despite New York's refusal
to adopt the federal discovery rules, a more liberal application of
CPLR 3101(a)(4) to the special facts of Dioguardi is necessary and
proper in order to remain faithful to the liberal disclosure policies
of Article 31.23 It is suggested that whenever a plaintiff intends to
call his treating physician to testify, a rebuttable presumption
should arise that mere disclosure of medical records will not allow
the defendant to prepare fully for trial, and thus, under the "spe-
cial circumstances" standard, a formal deposition of the treating
physician is warranted.24
In reaching its decision, the Dioguardi court relied on Cirale v.
80 Pine Street Corp.,2 5 where the plaintiff in a wrongful death ac-
tion was denied access to various documents and reports held by a
nonparty investigative committee.26 The Court of Appeals held
that the bare assertion of special circumstances would not suffice,
and that the plaintiff, the moving party, had to demonstrate an
inability to obtain "sufficient independent evidence" elsewhere
before the court would consider a new application for inspection of
the committee's report.2 7 It is suggested, however, that Dioguardi,
and other factually similar decisions,28 misapplied the Cirale hold-
22 See Dioguardi, 144 App. Div. 2d at 334, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 916; supra note 8 and ac-
companying text (change in language of amendment has no effect on substance of special
circumstances standard).
23 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
24 A rebuttable presumption is one which can be overturned upon the showing of ade-
quate proof. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1068 (5th ed. 1979). It is submitted that such a pre-
sumption would not require the moving party to show lack of special circumstances. See
generally Commissioner of Social Servs. v. Philip De G., 59 N.Y.2d 137, 140, 450 N.E.2d
681, 682-83, 463 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762-63 (1983) (presumptions shift the burden of producing
evidence, not the burden of proof); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2489 (3d ed. 1940) (burden of
proof never shifts). Rather, it would merely require the plaintiff to adduce some evidence
that any information which could be garnered from deposing the nonparty witness is availa-
ble from other sources. See generally infra text accompanying notes 31-34 (application of
rebuttable presumption to the facts of Dioguardi).
26 35 N.Y.2d 113, 316 N.E.2d 301, 359 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1974).
26 Id. at 115-16, 316 N.E.2d at 303, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
21 Id. at 117, 316 N.E.2d at 304, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 4. In Cirale, the plaintiff made no
showing that his own investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the explo-
sion would prove futile. Id. at 116-17, 316 N.E.2d at 304, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 3-4. Since access
to necessary information was assumed to be available, the plaintiff had to show that such
was not the case in order to obtain disclosure from the nonparty. Id.
28 See, e.g., Ferrer v. Horvath, 143 App. Div. 2d 627, 627-28, 533 N.Y.S.2d 7, 7 (2d
Dep't 1988); Shapiro v. Levine, 104 App. Div. 2d 800, 801, 479 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1008 (2d
Dep't 1984); Pantaleo v. Sacca, 64 App. Div. 2d 696, 696-97, 407 N.Y.S.2d 560, 561 (2d Dep't
1989] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ing. These courts failed to recognize that, typically, only the plain-
tiff can determine whether the medical record contains all the rele-
vant data because only the plaintiff may depose his treating
physician as of right.29 When one party is in a more advantageous
position to bring forth certain evidence, a presumption may be
used to compel him to proffer such evidence before his adversary
must carry his burden of proof.30 It is submitted that it is impossi-
ble for the defendant to ascertain independently whether the med-
ical record is "sufficient" to prepare fully for trial,3 ' without first
eliciting a statement from the plaintiff's physician confirming that
the latter does not recall any medically relevant acts, occurrences
or events other than those in his report.3 2 Assuming the plaintiff
makes this initial showing to the court, the presumption suggested
by this survey would be rebutted,33 and, as the Dioguardi court
held, the defendant would be required to demonstrate affirmatively
that the deposition is needed to prepare fully for trial. However, if
the physician's guarantee is not forthcoming, then a formal deposi-
tion would be warranted under the special circumstances standard
since the physician is a nonparty witness who possesses exclusive
1978).
"' See CPLR 3101(a)(3). No showing of materiality or special circumstances is required
when a party seeks to depose his or her own physician. CPLR 3101, commentary at 27
(McKinney Supp. 1989).
30 See, e.g., Rehm v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 157, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (res ispa
loquitur inference of negligence may be drawn if facts or occurrences so warrant and defend-
ant does not sufficiently rebut); Murray v. Paramount Petroleum Prods. Co., 101 Conn. 238,
125 A. 617, 618-19 (1924) (bailee who can not produce bailor's goods is presumed negligent);
McIver v. Schwartz, 50 R.I. 68, 145 A. 101, 102 (1929) (employee driving employer's automo-
bile presumed to be acting within scope of employment at time of accident); U.C.C. § 3-307
(1977) (signature on negotiable instrument presumed non-forgery).
3' See Cirale, 35 N.Y.2d at 117, 316 N.E.2d at 304, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 4. In Cirale, the
court held that plaintiff would have to show lack of sufficient independent evidence in order
to gain nonparty disclosure. Id.
31 See William v. Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283, 287, 129 N.E.2d 417, 419 (1955). As the
Williams court discussed:
The business of a hospital, it is self-evident, is to diagnose and treat its patients'
ailments. Consequently, the only memoranda that may be regarded as within the
section's compass are those reflecting acts, occurrences or events that relate to
diagnosis, prognosis or treatment or are otherwise "helpful to an understanding to
the medical or surgical aspects of ... [the particular patient's] hospitalization."
Id.
33 See J. PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 58, at 37 (10th ed. 1973). The amount of
evidence required to overcome a presumption will vary depending on the issue. Id. It is
submitted that production to the court of the treating physician's affidavit should suffice in
these circumstances.
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knowledge of material and necessary information. 4
The court's interpretation of the special circumstances re-
quirement in Dioguardi may result in nondisclosure of facts which
are needed by defendants to prepare fully for trial. By placing
upon the defendant the burden of showing facts despite the plain-
tiff's exclusive right to ascertain such evidence, the Dioguardi
court has narrowed the scope of nonparty disclosure far beyond
that intended by CPLR 3101(a)(4). The unique relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and his physician requires the more liberal in-
terpretation of the Cirale holding suggested in this survey. 5
Edward G. Kehoe
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW
DRL § 236(B): Appellate Division expands Equitable Distribu-
tion Law to include educational degrees as marital property sub-
ject to equitable distribution
Until 1980, parties involved in a judicially ordered property
distribution pursuant to a New York divorce decree were forced to
rely on common law rules which frequently resulted in "inequita-
ble" distribution.' In response, the New York State Legislature en-
" See O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 526, 523 N.E.2d 277, 279, 528
N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1988). The O'Neill court confirmed the long-held view that special circum-
stances are present when a nonparty possesses exclusive knowledge of facts which might be
material to the case. Id.
11 The First Department has applied the special circumstances standard to facts similar
to those in Dioguardi and has allowed for the deposition of a nonparty treating physician.
See Villano v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 46 App. Div. 2d 118, 122, 361 N.Y.S.2d 351,
355 (1st Dep't 1974); Names Unlimited, Inc. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 45 App. Div. 2d 696,
697, 357 N.Y.S.2d 72, 73 (lst Dep't 1974). In Villano, despite the availability of medical
records, the court granted deposition of plaintiff's treating physicians on the assumption
that they possessed special and exclusive knowlege which was necessary in order for defend-
ant to prepare fully for trial. Villano, 46 App. Div. 2d at 120, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 353. In Names
Unlimited, the analysis was the same. See Names Unlimited, 45 App. Div. 2d at 697, 357
N.Y.S.2d at 73.
' See DRL § 236(B), commentary at 140 (McKinney 1986). Prior to the passage of New
York's Equitable Distribution Law, courts were required to award property to the spouse
who held title, regardless of any contributions by the other spouse in acquiring the property.
